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SCOPE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT—POST-
HELLER STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N a controversial, 5–4 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to keep and carry arms in self-defense.1  At issue in Heller was a District of 
Columbia law that “totally [banned] handgun possession in the home” and 
further “[required] that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound 
by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.”2  Ruling in favor of Mr. 
Heller, the Court held that the District of Columbia “ban on handgun possession 
in the home [violated] the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against 
rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate 
self-defense.”3  As a result, the Court concluded that unless Heller is disqualified 
“from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to 
register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.”4 
Because Heller challenged a District of Columbia law, rather than a state 
law or an ordinance adopted by a political subdivision of a state, the Court did 
not have to address the incorporation issue—whether the Second Amendment is 
made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.5  Incorporation remains an issue for the lower courts, and ultimately 
the Supreme Court, to address in the future.6 
 
 * Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797, 2821-22 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 2817. 
 3. Id. at 2821-22. 
 4. Id. at 2822. 
 5. Id. at 2812-13 & n.23.  The Court noted that three of its decisions—Miller v. Texas, 153 
U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); and United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)—hold that the Second Amendment applies only to the federal 
government.  Id.  The trend, however, has been to incorporate the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
clause-by-clause, with only a few—including the Second and Third Amendments, the Fifth 
Amendment right to a grand jury indictment, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil 
cases, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines—not incorporated.  See, e.g., id. 
at 2817-18 n.27 (listing incorporated rights).  As stated in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court “has not 
hesitated to re-examine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in 
I 
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Another issue the Court did not decide, and the subject of this article, is the 
appropriate standard of review in cases challenging gun-control laws based on 
the Heller decision.  The majority stated that the right it discovered in the Second 
Amendment, “[l]ike most rights …[,] is not unlimited.”7  It found it unnecessary 
to determine the standard of review because, “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from 
the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for 
protection of one’s home and family’ would fail constitutional muster.”8  The 
Court’s determination in Heller that the Second Amendment comes into play 
when an individual claims a self-defense-related right to keep and carry arms, as 
opposed to only a militia-related right, tells us very little about the actual scope 
of this right.9  For the purposes of this article, I will accept the Court’s 
interpretation of the Second Amendment—even though I believe the dissenters 
have the better argument10—and I will instead focus on the limited, but very 
important, standard of review issue. 
Part II outlines what the majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion say about the standard of review.11  Part III discusses the process by 
which the Court currently determines the standard of review, particularly in cases 
alleging a violation of one of the amendments found in the Bill of Rights or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.12  In Part IV, I argue that one of the goals of judicial 
review should be improvement of the legislative process; a legislative body that 
 
the preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when they 
added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme.”  378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964). 
 6. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court explained that the test for determining whether the rights 
provided by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are incorporated has been stated in a variety of ways, 
including “whether a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at 
the base of all our civil and political institutions,’” “whether it is ‘basic in our system of 
jurisprudence,’” and “whether it is ‘a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.’”  391 U.S. 145, 
148-49 (1968) (internal citations omitted).  The Court concluded that “trial by jury in criminal cases 
is fundamental to the American scheme of justice” and incorporated this Sixth Amendment right.  
Id. at 149.  Before Heller, a few circuits decided that the Second Amendment should not be 
incorporated.  See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84-86 (2d Cir. 2005); Fresno Rifle & Pistol 
Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729-31 (9th Cir. 1992); Quilici v. Vill. of Morton 
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1982).  After Heller, the court in Maloney v. Cuomo decided 
it must follow Presser and confirmed its position in Bach.  554 F.3d 56, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2009).  See 
also National Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 
sub nom McDonald v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1521) 
(confirming its holding in Quilici).  Compare Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, reh’g en banc 
ordered by 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the Second Amendment is incorporated). 
 7. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. 
 8. Id. at 2717-18. 
 9. While the Second Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights, that too tells us little about the 
scope of the right because whether a provision in the Constitution actually protects an individual 
often depends on the standard of review the court applies.  But see id. 
 10. Id. at 2822-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847-70 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 12. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (applying 
rational basis, but reviewing the alleged reasons for refusal to grant permit to an assisted living 
center and finding them based on “irrational prejudice”). 
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engages in an in-depth analysis of its goal and the means of achieving that goal 
should receive greater deference from the courts.  Applying this approach, I 
conclude that “heightened rational basis scrutiny,” a standard utilized by the 
Court in other cases,13 is appropriate in cases challenging gun-control laws based 
on the Second Amendment. 
II.  WHAT HELLER SAYS ABOUT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, notes that “the right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”14  By this, the Court means 
that the right to keep and carry arms is not absolute, but allows at least some 
government regulation.15  For example, the Court writes:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.16   
The Court also recognized a distinction between weapons “in common use 
at the time” and weapons that were considered dangerous and unusual, because  
according to the Court, the right to “keep and carry arms” is limited to only those 
weapons that are “in common use at the time,” leaving the government free to 
prohibit “the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”17  These 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” according to the Court, should be 
viewed only as examples, not as an exhaustive list of permissible regulations.18  
This tells us little if anything about the standard of review, although a 
presumption of validity is usually associated with rational basis, not strict 
scrutiny.19  Under true strict scrutiny, any legislation conflicting with a 
constitutional right carries a presumption of invalidity and the right is therefore 
closer to being unlimited.20 
The Court avoided addressing the standard of review issue by concluding 
that the District of Columbia law would “fail constitutional muster” based on the 
Second Amendment “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have 
 
 13. See, e.g., id. 
 14. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2816-17. 
 17. Id. at 2817. 
 18. Id. at 2817 n.26. 
 19. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993) (holding that non-
suspect classifications, which are subject to rational basis review, have “a strong presumption of 
validity”). 
 20. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 876 (2002) (noting that “[i]f a 
statute is subjected to heightened scrutiny, it is almost invariably struck down”). 
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applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”21  In a footnote following this 
statement, the Court said that “Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like 
almost all laws, would pass rational-basis scrutiny.”22  Apparently, based on 
these statements, the Court has never utilized rational basis review in a case 
alleging that a law violates one of the “enumerated constitutional rights.”23  After 
noting its agreement with Justice Breyer’s conclusion that the District of 
Columbia law at issue would pass rational-basis scrutiny, the Court stated: 
[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws 
under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.  
In those cases, “rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very 
substance of the constitutional guarantee.  Obviously, the same test could not be 
used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, 
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double 
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.  If all that was 
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the 
Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.24 
Of course, if a constitutional provision specifically prohibited laws that are 
not rational, then the “very substance of the constitutional guarantee” would be 
the equivalent of “rational basis” review.25  The Court does not, however, 
identify an “enumerated” right in either the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth 
Amendment that specifically prohibits laws and government actions that are not 
rational.26  Rather, the Court has utilized rational basis review in certain cases 
alleging a violation of the Freedom of Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the 
First Amendment, as well as in cases alleging a violation of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.27  The Court’s 
redundancy point is no different in the Second Amendment context than in other 
contexts, such as cases where rational basis review is utilized in evaluating First 
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment claims.28 
 
 21. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008). 
 22. Id. at 2817 n.27. 
 23. Id.  As discussed below, this statement is problematic. 
 24. Id. (citations omitted). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id.  The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” action, but the prohibition is 
limited to “searches and seizures.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 27. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006) (Freedom of Speech) (noting that, 
unlike the case where a government employee is speaking as a citizen, which requires a “delicate 
balancing” of First Amendment issues, when “the employee is simply performing his or her job 
duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny”); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human 
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 885 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause). 
 28. See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 977-78 (2009). 
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As an example of its “evaluating laws under constitutional commands that 
are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws,”29 the Court refers to Engquist v. 
Oregon Department of Agriculture,30 where it held that the “class-of-one theory 
of equal protection” is not available to public employees challenging an 
employment decision.31  While the “class-of-one theory of equal protection,” 
recognized in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, is premised on the notion that the 
plaintiff has been singled out irrationally for different treatment, the substantive 
constitutional claim is based on the Equal Protection Clause and the standard of 
review is traditional rational basis.32  In fact, traditional rational basis review is 
the norm for equal protection claims unless the Court determines that a 
fundamental right is implicated or the classification is suspect or quasi-suspect, 
thereby triggering heightened scrutiny.33 
Heightened scrutiny includes strict scrutiny, the standard applied in 
discrimination claims based on race,34 national origin,35 and non-citizenship,36 as 
well as claims alleging the deprivation of a fundamental right as a result of a 
challenged classification.37  Heightened scrutiny also includes intermediate 
scrutiny, which is used to review claims of discrimination based on gender38 and 
illegitimacy.39  Yet another form of heightened scrutiny, although usually not 
identified as such, is heightened rational basis, under which the Court actually 
examines the justifications the government advances, rather than deferring 
completely to the legislature’s judgment.40  In short, equal protection cases span 
the entire “spectrum of standards” utilized under the level-of-scrutiny approach 
to constitutional claims.41 
 
 29. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27. 
 30. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). 
 31. Id. at 2156. 
 32. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000). 
 33. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (finding that “[u]nless a statute 
employs a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights … this 
Court properly exercises only a limited review power over Congress”). 
 34. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989). 
 35. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 36. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
 37. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (right to 
vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate).  The right to vote was 
subjected to rational basis review in Ball v. James, where the Court upheld a water reclamation 
district rule limiting voter eligibility to landowners and apportioning voting power according to the 
amount of land a voter owns because of the relatively narrow function of the local governmental 
body at issue.  451 U.S. 355, 357, 371 (1981). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).  See also Nguyen v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001). 
 39. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 40. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40, 449 (1985); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224, 228-30 (1982). 
 41. Justice Marshall, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, was critical of 
the Court’s “rigidified approach to equal protection analysis” that seeks to fit equal protection cases 
into “one of two neat categories” when in fact the Court “has applied a spectrum of standards in 
reviewing” such cases.  411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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Similarly, in cases alleging a violation of rights enumerated in the First 
Amendment, the Court has utilized a wide range of scrutiny levels, including 
rational basis.42  For example, in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,43 an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court 
applied rational basis to a free-exercise challenge to a facially-neutral law of 
general applicability.44  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, without explicitly saying so, the 
Court applied rational basis to reject a government employee’s free-speech claim 
where the speech was made in furtherance of the employee’s official duties.45 
Earlier cases discounted the First Amendment rights of government 
employees and applied a balancing test to resolve the competing interests at 
stake.46  The Court balanced the employees’ interest in commenting on matters of 
public concern against the government’s interest, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the services it provides.47  Other freedom of speech cases 
identify various categories of unprotected speech, such as fighting words,48 
speech that incites a hostile audience,49 speech conveying a true threat,50 
obscenity,51 and child pornography (speech exploiting children in pornographic 
productions),52 and uphold the regulation of such speech as long as the regulation 
is rational.53 
In another First Amendment case challenging the constitutionality of the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act, which denies public libraries federal funds for 
internet access unless they install software to block images that constitute 
obscenity or child pornography, Justice Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion applying rational basis.54  Justice Kennedy concurred, but left 
 
 42. Lara Geer Farley, Comment, A Matter of Public Concern: “Official Duties” of 
Employment Gag Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 603, 608 (2007). 
 43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 44. Id. at 885-89. 
 45. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006).  Determining that a government 
employee’s speech made as part of his or her official duties as an employee is not protected 
narrows the scope of the First Amendment and means that the government employer is free to 
restrict such speech as long as it acts rationally. 
 46. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
140, 142 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 47. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.  See also United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 490-93 (1995) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas) (arguing in favor of applying the government employee balancing test to a federal statute 
that broadly prohibits federal employees from accepting compensation for speeches or articles, and 
upholding the law). 
 48. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 49. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). 
 50. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-62 (2003). 
 51. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 52. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982). 
 53. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, however, the Court held that the City’s Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance was facially unconstitutional, even though it was construed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court as reaching only “fighting words,” because only certain “fighting words” were prohibited, 
meaning it discriminated based on content and/or viewpoint.  505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 54. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 208 (2003). 
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the door open to an as-applied challenge and suggested heightened scrutiny 
should apply.55  Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, suggested that heightened 
scrutiny, but not strict scrutiny, should apply where “complex, competing 
constitutional interests are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is 
potentially justified by unusually strong governmental interests.”56  According to 
Justice Breyer, the key question in this situation is typically “one of proper fit” 
and the appropriate inquiry is “whether the harm to speech-related interests is 
disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the potential 
alternatives.”57  This inquiry, he says, supplements the level-of-scrutiny approach 
and adds flexibility.58 
While the majority did not establish the standard of review for the Second 
Amendment right it discovered in Heller, it seemingly eliminated at least low-
level, or traditional, rational basis as the appropriate standard.59  Its reason for 
doing so appears suspect in light of the Court’s historic use of rational basis in 
cases alleging a violation of an enumerated constitutional right, as described 
above.60  Further, portions of the Heller opinion seem to cast doubt on whether 
the Court in fact foreclosed traditional rational-basis review in the Second 
Amendment context.61  After stating that “the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited,”62 the Court gave examples of “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms” that are “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures.”63  Under the “traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny],” 
challenged laws are “presumptively lawful” only when evaluated under 
traditional rational basis, not heightened scrutiny.64 
Whether a broad ban “on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill” would survive heightened scrutiny is unclear.65  For example, does 
one convicted of a non-violent felony, such as a “white-collar” crime, have less 
 
 55. Id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 216-17 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 217. 
 58. Id. at 218. 
 59. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 & n.27 (2008) (“If all that was 
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have 
no effect.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000); Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or., 494 U.S. 872 
485-89 (1990). 
 61. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797, 2821-22. 
 62. Id. at 2816. 
 63. Id. at 2816-17 & n.26. 
 64. See Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards:  The Supreme Court’s Refusal to 
Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause 
Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 259, 279 
(2009) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)) (noting that under rational-basis scrutiny, 
“a statute is presumed constitutional”). 
 65. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. 
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need for protection in his home than others?66  Does one who is “mentally ill,” 
with no history of violence, have less need for protection in his home?  Perhaps 
not, considering that, a woman who is “mentally ill” as a result of years of abuse 
and violence inflicted by her spouse may have a greater need for protection in her 
home than the average citizen.67  The point is simply that Justice Scalia’s list of 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures”68 may not withstand heightened 
scrutiny and that, therefore, he must have intended to suggest traditional rational-
basis review as the proper standard for Second Amendment claims. 
B. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Breyer 
In the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
Justice Breyer argued that the Court’s “conclusion is wrong for two independent 
reasons.”69  The first reason, described in Justice Stevens’s dissent, is that “the 
Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests.”70  
The second reason is that, because the protection the Second Amendment 
provides is not absolute, the “majority’s view cannot be correct unless it can 
show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second 
Amendment terms.”71  Justice Breyer’s second reason relates to the Court’s 
failure to supply a standard of review.72 
Justice Breyer began by asking what he refers to as a “process-based 
question: How is a court to determine whether a particular firearm regulation … 
is consistent with the Second Amendment?”73  He disagreed with the majority’s 
statement that the District of Columbia law is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of 
the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights.”74  Rather, as Justice Breyer pointed out, the law would not be 
unconstitutional under a rational basis standard since it bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.75  According to Justice Breyer, 
[T]he majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects [Heller’s proposal that the 
Court adopt strict scrutiny] by broadly approving a set of laws—prohibitions on 
concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, 
prohibitions on firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of 
 
 66. See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 
424 (2009) (“Felons who have served their sentences are no less susceptible to home invasions and 
assaults than are law-abiding people (perhaps even more susceptible).”). 
 67. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 9-14 (1996). 
 68. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26 
 69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2851. 
 73. Id. at 2850-51. 
 74. Id. at 2817, 2851. 
 75. Id. at 2851. 
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commercial firearm sales—whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard 
would be far from clear.76 
Justice Breyer further reasoned that “adoption of a true strict-scrutiny 
standard for evaluating gun regulations would be impossible” because most gun 
regulations seek to advance a compelling governmental interest in preventing 
crime and promoting public safety.77  Therefore, he predicted that 
[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice 
turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, 
the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the 
former in the course of advancing the latter.”78  
It appears that Justice Breyer was describing the second prong of strict 
scrutiny analysis, which asks whether the regulation at issue is narrowly tailored 
to serve the government’s compelling interest, although that prong is not always 
described as “an interest-balancing inquiry.”79  For example, in challenges to 
benign race-conscious action, the Court requires the government to show that no 
less restrictive, race-neutral means of accomplishing the government’s goal 
exist.80 
Because the interests on both sides of the issue are important, the dissenters 
would explicitly adopt an interest-balancing inquiry rather than an approach that 
carries a presumption of either constitutionality (rational basis) or 
unconstitutionality (strict scrutiny).81  In support of this approach, Justice Breyer 
pointed to his concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC82 
and his dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Western States Medical Care,83 as 
well as several other decisions of the Court.84  He could have pointed to his 
concurring opinion, joined by Justice O’Connor, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,85 in 
which he stated that the Court should “avoid adopting overly broad or rigid 
constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility,”86 
in cases where the issue “implicates competing constitutional concerns.”87  
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2852. 
 79. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 80. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). 
 81. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 82. 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 83. 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 84. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 339-49 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968). 
 85. 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001). 
 86. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 536.  The statute at issue in this case both fostered private speech by protecting 
privacy in telephone communications and interfered with media freedom.  Id. at 536-38.  Therefore, 
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Further, Justice Breyer cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,88 for the 
proposition that the Court, in applying the interest-balancing approach, “normally 
defers to a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters where a legislature is 
likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional factfinding capacity.”89  
In another First Amendment case, Justice Breyer purported to agree with the 
Court that the Child Online Protection Act should be subject to “the most 
exacting scrutiny,” but nevertheless appeared to employ a balancing test insofar 
as he characterized the Act as imposing a modest burden on some protected 
speech while significantly helping to achieve the congressional goal of protecting 
children from pornography.90 
Applying Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach, which requires the 
Court to ask “whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an 
extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon the other 
important governmental interests,”91 the dissenters concluded that the District of 
Columbia “measure is a proportionate, not a disproportionate, response to the 
compelling concerns that led the District to adopt it.”92  In reaching their 
conclusion, the dissenters asked “how the statute seeks to further the 
governmental interests that it serves, how the statute burdens the interest that the 
Second Amendment seeks to protect, and whether there are practical, less 
burdensome ways of furthering those interests.”93  The “ultimate question,” 
according to the dissenters, “is whether the statute imposes burdens that, when 
viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”94 
In examining the first factor, Justice Breyer considered “the facts as the 
legislature saw them when it adopted the District statute”95 and concluded that its 
“special focus on handguns … reflects the fact that the committee report found 
them to have a particularly strong link to undesirable activities in the District’s 
exclusively urban environment.”96  He also considered “the facts as a court must 
consider them looking at the matter as of today,”97 and concluded that the recent 
statistics presented to the Court tell essentially the same story that the committee 
report told thirty years earlier and, at least, “they present nothing that would 
permit us to second-guess the Council in respect to the numbers of gun crimes, 
injuries, and deaths, or the role of handguns.”98  Finally, he said that Heller and 
his amici generally do not disagree with the statistics, but rather “disagree 
 
Justice Breyer argued that strict scrutiny, with its strong presumption against constitutionality, is 
out of place.  Id. 
 88. 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997). 
 89. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 90. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 677-87 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 91. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 2870. 
 93. Id. at 2854. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2855. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2856. 
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strongly with the District’s predictive judgment that a ban on handguns will help 
solve the crime and accident problems that these figures disclose.”99  Justice 
Breyer agreed that the studies and counter-studies presented to the Court “could 
leave a judge uncertain about the proper policy conclusion,” but in reviewing a 
legislature’s “predictive judgments,” the role of the court is simply to ensure that 
the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence.”100 
The second factor addresses the extent to which the law at issue “burdens 
the interests that the Second Amendment seeks to protect.”101  Examining each of 
the interests advanced by Heller and his amici,102 as well as the majority—
preservation of a “well regulated Militia,”103 safeguarding the use of firearms for 
sporting activities,104 and assuring the use of firearms for self-defense105—Justice 
Breyer concluded that the District of Columbia law burdens the first two interests 
“little, or not at all,”106 and burdens to some degree the interest of self-defense, an 
interest that Justice Breyer assumed the Second Amendment seeks to further.107 
Addressing the third factor, the availability of “reasonable, but less 
restrictive alternatives,” Justice Breyer found no such alternative, suggesting that 
there is no plausible way to achieve a significant reduction in the number of 
handguns in the District other than to ban the guns.108  He said that the “absence 
of equally effective alternatives to a complete prohibition finds support in the 
empirical fact that other States and urban centers prohibit particular types of 
weapons,”109 suggesting that there may be no substitute for an outright 
prohibition where a governmental entity deems “a particular type of weapon 
especially dangerous.”110 
After examining these three factors, Justice Breyer turned to the final 
question, whether “the District’s law disproportionately burden[s Second] 
Amendment-protected interests.”111  Based on four considerations, he concluded 
 
 99. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2873, 2857 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 2860 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).  See also 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544-45 (2005) (expressing concern about using a 
“substantially advances” formula in Takings Clause jurisprudence because “it would empower—
and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected 
legislatures and expert agencies”). 
 101. Id. at 2861. 
 102. The following is a non-exhaustive list of parties filing amicus briefs on behalf of 
Respondent, Dick Heller: The State of Wisconsin; The American Center for Law and Policy; 
Former Senior Officials of the Department of Justice; The Center for Individual Freedom; and the 
National Rifle Association. 
 103. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814. 
 104. Id. at 2801. 
 105. Id. at 2822. 
 106. Id. at 2863 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 2863-64. 
 108. Id. at 2864. 
 109. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2873, 2864-65 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 2865. 
 111. Id. 
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that it did not.112  First, the District law is “tailored to the life-threatening 
problems it attempts to address,” and “there is no less restrictive way to achieve 
the problem-related benefits that it seeks.”113  Second, “the self-defense interest 
in maintaining loaded handguns in the home to shoot intruders is not the primary 
interest, but at most a subsidiary interest, that the Second Amendment seeks to 
serve.”114  Third, Justice Breyer found support in what eighteenth century 
legislatures thought they could enact in the way of gun control regulation, 
pointing to the fact that Samuel Adams, who lived in Boston, supported a 
constitutional amendment providing protection similar to that provided by the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which did not trump a Massachusetts law that 
prohibited residents of Boston from keeping loaded guns in the house.115  In other 
words, Justice Breyer thought it unlikely that Samuel Adams would have 
supported a constitutional amendment that would have precluded the District of 
Columbia from adopting a law similar to the Massachusetts law governing 
Boston.116  The question, he argued, “should not be whether a modern restriction 
on a right to self-defense duplicates a past one, but whether that restriction, when 
compared with restrictions originally thought possible, enjoys a similarly strong 
justification.”117  Fourth, Justice Breyer predicted that the Court’s decision “will 
have unfortunate consequences,” in that it invites legal challenges to gun 
regulations throughout the country without providing standards for resolving the 
challenges and, more importantly, it “threatens severely to limit the ability of 
more knowledgeable, democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related 
problems.”118 
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia observed that Justice Breyer 
“proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally expressed levels (strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), but rather a judge-empowering, 
‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”119  Justice Scalia also said that he is not aware of 
any “other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”120  In response to the 
“judge-empowering” comment, Justice Breyer indicated that he takes such 
criticism seriously and explained that the Court has taken the same approach in 
other areas of constitutional law.121  He conceded that his approach “requires 
judgment”, but points out that his method is transparent in that it requires 
“careful identification of the relevant interests” and evaluation of “the law’s 
effect upon them.”122  It is not obvious that Justice Breyer’s approach is more 
 
 112. Id. at 2865-68. 
 113. Id. at 2865-66. 
 114. Id. at 2866. 
 115. Id. at 2867-68. 
 116. Id. at 2867. 
 117. Id. at 2868. 
 118. Id. 
 119. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2868. 
 122. Id. 
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“judge-empowering” than the levels-of-scrutiny approach, since the latter 
requires judges to make judgments about the government’s interests—whether 
they are legitimate, important, or compelling—as well as the government’s 
chosen means—whether they are rationally related to a legitimate interest, 
substantially related to an important interest, or narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest. 
In Mistretta v. United States,123 Justice Scalia recognized that a “certain 
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial 
action.”124  In Estate of McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission,125 challenging an 
Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, 
Justice Scalia characterized the case as “the most difficult case for determining 
the meaning of the Constitution” because there is no accepted existence of such 
governmental restrictions, but their absence cannot “clearly be attributed to 
constitutional objections.”126  Constitutional adjudication, in such a case, 
“necessarily involves not just history but judgment: judgment as to whether the 
government action under challenge is consonant with the concept of the protected 
freedom … that existed when the constitutional protection was accorded.”127  
Justice Scalia would have upheld the Ohio law because a “governmental practice 
that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that 
has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.”128 
In sum, the dissenters criticized the majority for failing to provide sufficient 
guidance to the lower courts on how to approach Second Amendment challenges 
to a wide range of gun-related laws.129  They attempted to limit the effect of the 
Court’s decision by supplying a standard that would appear to leave legislative 
bodies with substantial discretion and deference in regulating firearms.130  While 
identifying the appropriate standard for challenges based on the Second 
Amendment presents a new challenge for the courts, it is an issue that has been 
addressed frequently in the context of challenges based on other constitutional 
 
 123. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 124. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 125. Estate of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 126. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id.  In contrast, Justice Thomas agreed the law is unconstitutional, saying “we should 
determine whether the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or of the press,’ as originally understood, 
protected anonymous political leafleting.”  He believed that it did.  Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 128. Id. at 375. 
 129. In a different context, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, was very critical of Justice 
Kennedy’s refusal to find a political gerrymandering claim nonjusticiable, instead concluding that 
the plaintiffs “failed to state a claim as to political gerrymandering, without ever articulating what 
the elements of such a claim consist of,” thus providing “no guidance to lower court judges and 
perpetuat[ing] a cause of action with no discernible content.”  League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 406 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See also 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (where Justice Scalia noted that because “no judicially 
discernable and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have 
emerged, … gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable”). 
 130. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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provisions.131  How the lower courts should approach the issue, and what 
standard they should adopt, will be addressed in the following parts. 
III.  HOW THE COURT CURRENTLY DETERMINES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
While judges, lawyers, and law students often fight about the appropriate 
standard of review in constitutional litigation, the importance of identifying the 
appropriate standard for a particular case or for a particular type of claim may be 
overrated.132  One may legitimately question whether the Court’s chosen standard 
of review helps it to decide a particular case or whether it simply provides a 
rationale or justification after the decision is made.133  Further, there is much 
slack within each of the three most commonly utilized standards—rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  For example, one view of rational 
basis, which gives almost complete deference to the legislative body, permits the 
Court to supply a rationale even if the legislative process failed to do so.134  
Another version results in a much more searching inquiry, in which the Court 
determines whether the government’s interest is legitimate and whether its 
proffered justifications are supported in fact.135  Similarly, the intermediate 
scrutiny utilized in equal protection cases alleging discrimination based on 
illegitimacy136 is less demanding than the intermediate scrutiny utilized in sex-
discrimination cases where the government’s justification must be “exceedingly 
persuasive.”137 
The same range is present with respect to strict scrutiny review in equal 
protection cases.  The standard in cases involving an alienage-based 
classification138 is less demanding than the standard in cases involving a race-
 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 2851-52 (discussing why the standard used is important and providing 
examples of decisions where the court used various standards of review). 
 132. See generally, e.g., Virginia P. Croudace & Steven A. Desmarais, Note, Where the Boys 
Are:  Can Separate Be Equal in School Sports?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1985) 
(“Application of [the] standard leaves considerable room for judicial discretion, because what 
constitutes a close fit between the statutory classification and the objective sought cannot be 
defined with any degree of precision.”). 
 133. But see generally Richard H.W. Maloy, “Standards of Review”—Just a Tip of the Icicle, 
77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 603 (2000) (explaining characteristics of standards of review such as 
what they are, why the Court has them, and how they are formulated). 
 134. This is demonstrated by cases such as FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 
313-20 (1993), and U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1980). 
 135. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-35 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40, 449 (1985). 
 136. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976) (administrative convenience 
justifies a classification). 
 137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
 138. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (holding that “classifications 
based on alienage … are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”).  But see, e.g., 
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-300 (1978) (law requiring state troopers to be citizens held 
constitutional because “citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the 
particular position”). 
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based classification,139 although the difference is accomplished by creating an 
exception for some alienage classifications.140  In Graham v. Richardson,141 the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down a statute that conditioned public 
assistance benefits on citizenship or fifteen-year residency in the United States, 
but in Foley v. Connelie, the Court created an exception and applied rational 
basis to uphold a citizenship requirement for state trooper positions.142 
To the extent that the standard of review depends on the governmental 
interest at stake, ranging from legitimate (rational basis) to important 
(intermediate scrutiny) to compelling (strict scrutiny), courts have great 
discretion in attaching a label to the governmental interest.143  There is no magic 
formula for determining which “value” should be assigned to a particular 
governmental interest.144  The value assigned is usually not based on empirical 
data, but rather the judgment of a judge or judges.145  Similarly, application of the 
second prong, ranging from rational relationship (rational basis) to substantial 
relationship (intermediate scrutiny) to narrowly tailored (strict scrutiny), is 
discretionary and requires judgment.146  Thus, it is not clear whether the “interest-
balancing inquiry” Justice Breyer proposed in Heller147 is any more “judge-
empowering” than the “traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny]” Justice Scalia 
seemingly preferred, though he did not expressly indicate which level he would 
utilize.148 
Even though the levels-of-scrutiny approach and the interest-balancing 
approach that judges use to identify the proper standard of review are “judge-
empowering” since they require judgment and the exercise of discretion, both 
approaches serve a useful purpose.149  A standard of review provides guidance 
and helps determine where the presumptions lie.150  For example, lawyers and 
their clients challenging laws in cases that trigger only traditional rational basis 
review know they have an uphill battle, while those challenging laws in cases 
 
 139. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 140. See, e.g., Foley, 435 U.S. at 296-300. 
 141. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72. 
 142. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296-300 (police officers).  See also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 
432, 445-46 (1982) (citizenship requirement upheld for probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 75-82 (1979) (citizenship requirement upheld for public school teachers). 
 143. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 2035, 2042-43 (2008). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 132, at 1435 (“Application of [the] standard 
leaves considerable room for judicial discretion, because what constitutes a close fit between the 
statutory classification and the objective sought cannot be defined with any degree of precision.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847-70 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 2817 & n.27. 
 149. Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 n.44 (2003) (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER:  THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002)). 
 150. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993) (holding that non-suspect 
classifications, which are subject to rational basis review, have “a strong presumption of validity”). 
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that demand strict scrutiny know success is likely.151  Thus, once the standard of 
review is established for a particular type of case, it will either encourage or 
discourage litigation.152  The absence of a standard of review for Second 
Amendment challenges likely will encourage, rather than discourage, litigation 
because neither side is in a good position to predict the outcome.153 
The majority opinion may be viewed as eliminating rational basis review, 
thereby encouraging litigation.  The dissenters propose a balancing-of-the-
interests approach that, while not entirely predictive, is likely to discourage 
litigation because, according to the dissenters, even the restrictive District of 
Columbia law would have been upheld under that approach.  Further, a standard 
of review puts government bodies interested in implementing gun-control laws 
on notice of the legislative record and places them in the best position to defend 
such laws when challenged in court.154  A standard of review provides a related 
tool for litigants by helping them establish a framework for presenting their 
arguments.155 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority, particularly the non-exhaustive list 
of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” suggests that a compromise was 
required to obtain the fifth vote.156  While this is risky, it can be assumed that 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito would prefer strict, or at least 
intermediate, scrutiny, while Justice Kennedy was unwilling to join an opinion 
establishing such a standard.157  If this assumption is accurate, then Justice 
Kennedy holds the key, as is frequently the case with the current Court.158  The 
question then becomes what standard of review, or what approach to determining 
the scope of the right identified in Heller, is Justice Kennedy likely to adopt, 
given the fact that he joined an opinion saying “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from 
the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for 
protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”159  As 
stated earlier, that sentence is a bit curious, though it was perhaps necessary to 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1984). 
 154. Allocation of the burden of proof is informed by the standard of review, with traditional 
rational basis imposing a heavy burden on the challenger (presumption of validity) and strict 
scrutiny imposing a heavy burden on government (presumption of invalidity).  See, e.g., Beach 
Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313-15 (1993) (holding that non-suspect classifications, which are subject 
to rational basis review, have “a strong presumption of validity”). 
 155. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.  See also Tushnet, supra note 66, at 419-20. 
 156. See generally Tushnet, supra note 66 (discussing the Heller compromise in greater detail). 
 157. Id. at 420. 
 158. Examples include cases challenging restrictions on abortion and voluntary, benign race-
conscious programs. 
 159. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008) (citing Parker v. District of 
Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (2007)). 
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allow the majority to dispose of the case in the manner chosen, without 
identifying a standard of scrutiny to govern future cases.160 
In searching for the appropriate standard of review or level of scrutiny in 
Second Amendment claims, courts could, of course, begin with the famous 
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.161  That footnote, however, is 
of little help because it simply indicates that “[t]here may be narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the 
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”162  In other words, the rational basis standard 
that the Court in Carolene Products employed to review a due process challenge 
to federal “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions,”163 
may not be appropriate when enumerated rights are at issue.164 
In City of Cleburne, an equal protection challenge to the denial of a special 
use permit for the operation of a group home for persons with mental disabilities, 
the Court discussed the standards devised by the courts “for determining the 
validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying 
equal protection.”165  After stating the general rule, “that legislation is presumed 
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest,”166 the Court summarized the 
three-tier, level-of-scrutiny standard of review ranging from rational basis to 
heightened review, either intermediate or strict scrutiny.167  It concluded that the 
court of appeals had “erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect 
classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is 
normally accorded economic and social legislation.”168 
The Court identified four reasons in support of its conclusion: (1) the large 
size and the diversity of the class, which makes determining the appropriate 
treatment of the group a difficult and technical matter for which legislators are 
better suited than the judiciary;169 (2) the legislative response to the plight of 
class members demonstrates that lawmakers have been addressing issues related 
to the class “in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a 
corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary,” i.e., legislators 
 
 160. See Tushnet, supra note 66, at 419-20 (discussing the compromise needed to obtain Justice 
Kennedy’s vote). 
 161. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 152-53. 
 164. Strict scrutiny may be utilized “when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by 
the Constitution.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).  But 
see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1992) (rejecting the argument that strict scrutiny 
applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to vote and utilizing a flexible balancing 
standard). 
 165. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40. 
 166. Id. at 440. 
 167. Id. at 440-42. 
 168. Id. at 442. 
 169. Id. at 442-43. 
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are not ignoring the concerns of the class;170 (3) the legislative response shows 
public support and “negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically 
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the 
lawmakers”;171 and (4) if this “large and amorphous” class is deemed quasi-
suspect, it would be difficult to distinguish other groups with immutable 
disabilities, such as the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm, who 
can claim some degree of prejudice from the general public.172  After rejecting 
heightened scrutiny, the Court noted that this does not leave the class “entirely 
unprotected from invidious discrimination”173 because the classification still had 
to survive rational basis review and, in fact, the Court found a violation of equal 
protection.174 
The Court’s analysis in City of Cleburne incorporated the same criteria 
identified in previous cases where the Court has searched for the appropriate 
standard of review.175  For example, the Court has considered immutable 
characteristics, the ability of the group to protect itself through the political 
process, the history of discrimination against the group, and the likelihood that 
the classification reflects prejudice rather than a legitimate justification.176  In 
short, the Court has almost unfettered discretion in determining the appropriate 
standard of review in each particular case, and how a justice views the merits of 
each case will certainly influence that determination.177  Therefore, given the 
close vote on the merits in Heller and the likelihood that Justice Kennedy is the 
key, an examination of his approach to the standard of review may be instructive. 
Two Fourteenth Amendment cases in which Justice Kennedy wrote the 
opinion of the Court might shed some light on his approach.178  In Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court held that a “Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of 
the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct” violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.179  More specifically, the Court 
held that the petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.”180  “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter.”181  The “Texas statute 
 
 170. Id. at 443-45. 
 171. Id. at 445. 
 172. Id. at 445-46. 
 173. Id. at 446. 
 174. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  
 177. See, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 143, at 2042. 
 178. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 179. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 180. Id. at 578. 
 181. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). 
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[furthered] no legitimate state interest [that could] justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”182 
Justice Kennedy did not explicitly state the standard of review, but his 
reference to the lack of a “legitimate” state interest suggests some version of 
rational basis review.183  At the same time, his opinion clearly demands more 
than mere rationality; his analysis is better characterized as heightened rational 
basis or a form of balancing along the lines of what Justice Breyer has suggested 
in a number of cases.184  Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and Thomas, criticized Justice Kennedy for applying “an unheard-of 
form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this 
case.”185 
Justice Kennedy also wrote the opinion of the Court in a related case, Romer 
v. Evans,186 which held that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that 
repealed current laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination and prevented 
the future enactment of such laws in Colorado, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.187  After stating that “if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it 
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end,”188 the Court concluded that the 
Colorado amendment did not satisfy rational basis because it was “born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected” and a bare “‘desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.’”189 
 
 182. Id. at 578 (citation omitted).  Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion agreeing that the Texas 
statute is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, we 
have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a 
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates 
among groups of persons. 
Id. at 582 (citations omitted).  More generally, Justice O’Connor said “[w]hen a law exhibits such a 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational 
basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 580. 
 183. Id. at 578. 
 184. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 677-87 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Government 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
180, 195-96 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 339-49 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968). 
 185. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 186. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 187. Id. at 635-36. 
 188. Id. at 631. 
 189. Id. at 634 (citing Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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The review Justice Kennedy utilized in those two cases is vastly different 
from the rational basis the Court used in cases such as United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz,190 Federal Communications Commission v. Beach 
Communications, Inc.,191 and Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,192 in 
which the Court required only “plausible” reasons for the legislative action—
even if the plausible reasons identified failed to provide a basis for the legislative 
decision, or any conceivable legislative purpose.193  Further, the Court in those 
cases placed the burden on the challenger to negate every conceivable basis that 
might support the legislation.194  Thus, the Court’s approach to “rational basis” 
review ranges from almost complete deference to the legislative body195 to a 
more searching inquiry into whether the government can articulate a legitimate 
purpose and whether the classification bears a rational relation to that legitimate 
purpose.196 
This heightened form of rational basis review was applied in two cases 
decided before Justice Kennedy was on the Court.  In the first, City of Cleburne, 
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,197 the Court applied rational basis to hold 
that denying a special use permit to operate a group home for the mentally 
retarded violated the Equal Protection Clause.198  The second case, Plyler v. 
Doe,199 held that a Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying 
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provided to 
children who are U.S. citizens or legally admitted aliens.200  Certainly, the 
District of Columbia law at issue in Heller would survive the “regular,” or 
traditional, rational basis standard utilized in Fritz,201 Beach,202 and Railway 
Express,203 and it may very well have survived application of what is referred to 
as heightened rational basis, which was utilized in Lawrence,204 Romer,205 City of 
Cleburne,206 and Plyler.207  Promoting public safety is obviously a legitimate, if 
 
 190. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
 191. 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
 192. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 193. See generally FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993); U.S. R.R. Ret. 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-
10 (1949). 
 194. See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (noting that “those attacking the rationality of 
the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it’”). 
 195. See generally id. 
 196. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 197. 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985). 
 198. Id. at 447-50. 
 199. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 200. Id. at 224-26. 
 201. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179. 
 202. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313-14. 
 203. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949). 
 204. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003). 
 205. Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
 206. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). 
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not compelling, governmental interest, and there is no indication that gun-control 
laws in general are “born of animosity.”208  Similarly, the District of Columbia, 
as well as municipalities and states, could demonstrate a rational relationship 
between the safety interest and the gun-control legislation, a relationship the 
Court found lacking in City of Cleburne.209 
First Amendment cases are helpful in understanding the flexibility with 
which Justice Kennedy determines the appropriate standard of review.  In his 
concurring opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,210 Justice 
Kennedy favored a flexible approach to a content-based ordinance that regulated 
the location of “adult speech businesses” in order to reduce the secondary effects 
of such businesses.211  In an earlier case, City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc.,212 a similar ordinance that regulated adult speech businesses was described 
as “content-neutral,” which meant that it fell into the Court’s time, place, and 
manner analysis and, as a result, triggered intermediate, rather than strict, 
scrutiny.213  Justice Kennedy said that such ordinances clearly are content-based, 
and that the Court should have recognized this.214  Nevertheless, he said “[a] 
zoning law need not be blind to the secondary effects of adult speech, so long as 
the purpose of the law is not to suppress it.”215  He further reasoned that if such 
an ordinance “is more in the nature of a typical land-use restriction and less in the 
nature of a law suppressing speech,” then “the ordinance is not so suspect that we 
must employ the usual rigorous analysis that content-based laws demand in other 
instances.”216  Therefore, while Justice Kennedy agreed that the Court should 
utilize intermediate scrutiny, as it did in Renton, he took a different route to 
arrive at that conclusion.217 
To Justice Kennedy, the key to justifying an ordinance that prohibits two 
adult businesses under the same roof is a factual showing that the “ordinance will 
cause two businesses to split rather than one to close, that the quantity of speech 
will be substantially undiminished, and that total secondary effects will be 
significantly reduced.”218  Justice Kennedy went on to say that cities must have 
“latitude to experiment,” that “very little evidence is required,” and that “courts 
should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical 
assessments of city planners.”219  Such deference is justified because the city 
 
 207. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 634 (1996). 
 209. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-49. 
 210. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 211. Id. at 445-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 212. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 4 (1986). 
 213. Id. at 48-50. 
 214. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the term 
“content neutral” is “imprecise”). 
 215. Id. at 447. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 445-53. 
 218. Id. at 451. 
 219. Id. 
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council “knows the streets of Los Angeles better than we do.”220  Similarly, I 
expect the city council of Chicago, for example, “knows the streets of [Chicago] 
better than [the Justices] do” and, therefore, Justice Kennedy might say “courts 
should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical 
assessment of city [officials]” who decide gun-control ordinances are needed.221 
In another First Amendment case, Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes,222 an independent candidate for a congressional position 
challenged his exclusion from a candidate debate sponsored by a state-owned 
public television broadcaster.223  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, avoided 
heightened scrutiny by using the forum analysis, even though he conceded that 
public broadcasting generally does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum 
analysis, and characterizing the debate as a nonpublic forum.224  As a result, the 
exclusion of Forbes only had to be a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of 
journalistic discretion and the constitutional challenge was rejected.225 
Recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,226 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the 
Court, relied on government employers’ “heightened interests in controlling 
speech made by an employee in his or her professional capacity”227 to create an 
unprotected subcategory of government employee speech—statements made 
“pursuant to [employees’] official duties.”228  As pointed out by the dissenters, 
including Justice Breyer,229 there was no need to categorically exclude such 
employee speech from First Amendment protection because the government’s 
interests are protected adequately under the balancing that Pickering required.230  
In effect, Justice Kennedy determined, as a matter of law, that balancing always 
favors the government employer when its employees speak as part of their 
official duties.231 
 
 220. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002).  Justice Scalia 
expressed a similar view in his dissenting opinion in Estate of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, criticizing the majority for “set[ting] their own views—on a practical matter that bears 
closely upon the real-life experience of elected politicians and not upon that of unelected judges—
up against the views of 49 … state legislatures and the Federal Congress,” in striking down an Ohio 
statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature.  514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, in Heller, Justice Scalia said that “the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table[, including] the absolute 
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”  District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). 
 221. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451. 
 222. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 223. Id. at 669-701. 
 224. Id. at 672-76. 
 225. Id. at 669. 
 226. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 227. Id. at 422. 
 228. Id. at 423. 
 229. Id. at 444-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 427-44 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 230. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 231. Id. at 569-70 (explaining that the statements in the case were not made in an official 
capacity). 
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The Court has reached a general consensus that the rights protected by the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are not absolute.232  This opens the 
door to legislation restricting constitutional rights or, more accurately, their 
scope.233  When such legislation is challenged as an infringement on a 
constitutional right, the Court then reviews the legislation and definitively 
determines the scope of the right.234  This is the Court’s role, a role that dates 
back to the Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, which first established 
judicial review.235 
Ever since 1803, the Court has struggled with the critical question not 
addressed in Marbury—the scope of judicial review or the appropriate deference 
to afford the legislative decision at issue.236  Particularly in First and Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, the Court frequently utilizes the levels-of-scrutiny analysis as 
a means to explain or quantify the appropriate deference a legislative decision 
should receive.237  This serves a purpose, but it has serious limitations and 
generally oversimplifies, or maybe hides, what the Court is really doing.238  
Sometimes the Court abandons the levels-of-scrutiny analysis and instead 
balances the interests of the government against the interests of the individual.239  
Whether done explicitly, as Justice Breyer does in Heller,240 or implicitly under 
the levels-of-scrutiny guise, the justices are making judgments.241  Marbury is 
judge-empowering and any approach will require judges to make judgments.242  
While Justice Scalia is critical of the balancing approach because he believes it is 
too “judge-empowering,” as pointed out above, it is difficult to understand how it 
is more empowering than the levels-of-scrutiny approach considering all of the 
judgments required in its application.243  Therefore, it can be assumed that judge 
empowerment is not a legitimate factor in determining the appropriate standard 
of review.244 
 
 232. Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire:  The New Consensus on the Second 
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1142 (1996) (“Like other rights in the Bill of Rights, [the Second 
Amendment Right] is not absolute ….”). 
 233. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 234. See Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Redefining the Relationship Between the States and the Federal 
Government:  A Focus on the Supreme Court’s Expansion of the Principle of State Sovereign 
Immunity, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 25 (2001). 
 235. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
 236. Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to Constitutional Interpretation, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
485, 485 (2001). 
 237. Id. at 500-03. 
 238. See Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett:  Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a 
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183, 205-06. 
 239. See Clark, supra note 236, at 506-09. 
 240. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 241. See Clark, supra note 236, at 500-03. 
 242. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
 243. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 244. One might argue that judges are paid to make judgments. 
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IV.  A REVISED APPROACH TO THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO SECOND AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
The current levels-of-scrutiny approach should be abandoned because it 
offers little assistance in tough cases.  As a practical matter, deciding to utilize 
traditional rational basis in a case is another way of saying the challenger loses, 
while deciding to utilize true strict scrutiny is another way of saying the 
challenger wins.245  There may be exceptions here and there, but not many.246 
With the exception of challenges to benign race-conscious actions, in essence, 
there is no real judicial review at either end of the spectrum—application of 
traditional rational basis means the law is upheld and application of true strict 
scrutiny means the law is struck down.247 
The difficult cases are those where the standard of review is one located 
somewhere between traditional rational basis248 and true strict scrutiny, as in race 
cases.249  In these cases, the Court makes a judgment as to the importance of the 
justification or goal the government relies on, determines the extent of the burden 
imposed on the constitutional interest, conducts a fairly rigorous assessment of 
the match between the justification or goal and the means (the restriction 
imposed on the constitutional interest) utilized to accomplish the governmental 
goal, and then determines whether the goal is sufficiently served by the 
restriction, (i.e., whether the particular restriction on a constitutional interest is 
justified).250  Whatever labels are attached to this heightened judicial review 
process, it provides an incentive to improve the legislative process.251 
 
 245. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993) (non-suspect 
classifications, which are subject to rational basis review, have “a strong presumption of validity”). 
 246. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny but upholding 
the benign race-conscious admissions program of the University of Michigan Law School); Burson 
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny but upholding a content-based regulation 
prohibiting distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place). 
 247. Compare Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313-15, with Yoshino, supra note 20, at 769 
(noting that strict scrutiny review carries a presumption of invalidity). 
 248. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 
307; Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 249. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (requiring the “‘most rigid scrutiny’”) 
(quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
 250. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-90, 397-98 (2000) (holding 
state’s campaign contribution restrictions were constitutional by applying less than strict scrutiny). 
 251. In discussing the relationship between due process and equal protection, Justice Jackson 
said: 
Invocation of the Equal Protection Clause … does not disable any governmental body from 
dealing with the subject at hand.  It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have 
a broader impact.  I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal 
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants 
except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.  This 
equality is not merely abstract justice.  The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should 
not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
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Proposed legislation should have an identified goal and the proposed 
restrictions imposed on constitutional interests should actually promote that 
goal.252  If there are a number of means available with an equal likelihood of 
achieving the goal, the legislative body should choose the one with the least 
adverse impact on the constitutional interest at stake.253  In making these 
judgments, the legislative body should conduct hearings, gather information, and 
seek out the assistance of experts.254  When the legislative process is transparent, 
and those involved make an honest effort to assess potential benefits and the 
extent of any restrictions, then deference to the legislative process makes 
sense.255  In part, effective judicial review promotes and rewards good process 
while discounting the products of sloppy process.256 
A good example of judicial review along the lines described above is found 
in City of Cleburne,257 in which the Court found that the denial of a “special use 
permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded”258 violated 
equal protection, in large part because the reasons advanced by the City in 
support of the denial simply were not supported by the record.259  While the 
Court rejected the challengers’ argument that the mentally retarded constitute a 
quasi-suspect class and heightened scrutiny should be utilized, its rational basis 
review was much more searching than traditional rational basis.260  In fact, the 
review utilized in City of Cleburne would result in most, if not all, invidious 
racial classifications being struck down.261   
Another example is found in First Amendment challenges to content-neutral 
time, place, or manner restrictions on speech.262  Such a restriction is not as 
offensive to First Amendment values as a restriction that bans speech.263  In his 
dissenting opinion in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., Justice Stevens said “[a] 
 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would 
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 252. See Barry Bostrom, Karlin v. Foust:  United States District Court Western District of 
Wisconsin June 19, 1997, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 377, 382 (1999). 
 253. Barry Sullivan, Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Good Samaritan Statutes, 8 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 27, 32-29 (1983). 
 254. In a case addressing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court imposed a 
“rough proportionality” standard requiring the city to “make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development.”  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 255. See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 255 
(2008). 
 256. See id. 
 257. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 258. Id. at 435. 
 259. Id. at 448-50. 
 260. Id. at 446. 
 261. Id. at 450 (because “irrational prejudice” against a group is not a rational basis). 
 262. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). 
 263. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 322 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (upholding 
an ordinance banning public nudity when applied to expressive, nude erotic dancing). 
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dispersal that simply limits the places where speech may occur is a minimal 
imposition, whereas a total ban is the most exacting of restrictions.”264  This is 
because “[t]he State’s interest in fighting presumed secondary effects is 
sufficiently strong to justify the former, but far too weak to support the latter, 
more severe burden.”265  Content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions are 
supposedly subjected to intermediate scrutiny, as is a regulation of expressive 
conduct that is aimed at the conduct rather than the message,266 but the review is 
less than rigorous, at least where government is regulating low value speech, 
such as adult entertainment.267  The Court’s willingness to relax the evidentiary 
basis for municipal assertions about the negative “secondary effects” of adult 
entertainment demonstrates this lack of rigor.268 
When deciding the many Second Amendment challenges to gun-control 
legislation and regulation that inevitably will follow Heller, the courts should 
apply a standard of review that (a) is not based on presumptions, (b) takes into 
account the importance of the governmental interest or goal—public safety, 
(c) takes into account the value of the Second Amendment right discovered in 
Heller—self-defense,269 (d) requires government to establish an evidentiary 
record, as part of the legislative or regulatory process, showing an actual 
connection between its goal and the restrictions imposed on guns, and (e) gives 
substantial deference to the legislative assessment of the fit between goals and 
restrictions, where this assessment is based on empirical data reflected in the 
legislative record.  This can be accomplished by heightened rational basis, as 
applied in City of Cleburne,270 or lowered intermediate scrutiny, as applied in the 
 
 264. Id. at 322. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). 
 267. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429-30 (2002) 
(overruling lower court’s determination that law against allowing multiple adult oriented stores in 
the same building was a content based distinction and holding that “[t]he City of Los Angeles may 
reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the present version of [the law] 
to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interests in reducing 
crime”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (holding that “zoning 
ordinances requiring that adult motion picture theaters not be located within 1,000 feet of two other 
regulated uses does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  The 
Court further noted that since the “record discloses a factual basis for the [City] Council’s 
conclusions that the [1,000 foot] restriction will have the desired effect[,]” the Court would not 
“appraise the wisdom of its decision.”  Young, 427 U.S. at 71.  
 268. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (“In Renton, we specifically refused to set such a high bar 
[of requiring a municipality to disprove every other theory for the link between high concentrations 
of adult operations and secondary effects other than its own] for municipalities that want to address 
merely the secondary effects of protected speech.  We held that a municipality may rely on any 
evidence that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ for demonstrating a connection between 
speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”). 
 269. Interestingly, gun-control laws and the self-defense-related right discovered in Heller have 
a common goal—safety.  This argues against any presumption in favor of either the laws or the 
Second Amendment.  See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 216-17 (2003) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 270. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  See also 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (applying a heightened standard of rational basis 
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low-value speech cases,271 although part (d) imposes a more rigorous burden on 
government than the Court imposes in the low-value speech cases.272  The 
evidentiary burden is required to justify the substantial deference afforded to the 
legislative fact-finding process as required by part (e).  In most, if not all, Second 
Amendment cases, this approach will lead to the same result as Justice Breyer’s 
interest-balancing inquiry and will allow government considerable room to 
impose gun controls.273  However, this proposed standard of review will give 
more guidance to both legislators and litigants and explicitly encourages 
legislative bodies to improve their process.274 
After Heller, legislative bodies considering gun-control laws know that they 
are operating in a zone in which the Constitution (Second Amendment) is in play 
and that any law they adopt will likely be challenged in court.275  The committee 
or legislator initiating the law should openly address the constitutional limits the 
Court imposed in Heller and should seek the advice of counsel to ensure that the 
new law is within those limits.  In addition to attorneys, other experts, as well as 
citizens, can assist in the process by helping to identify the problem, measuring 
the scope of the problem, identifying methods of addressing the problem, 
assessing the likely effectiveness of the various methods, and selecting the 
remedial method that is likely to achieve the desired result without unduly 
burdening the constitutional right.  Of course, there is no guarantee that a court 
will agree, but it is much easier to give substantial deference to the decision of a 
legislative body that engaged in an open, good faith attempt to identify the scope 
of the constitutional right at issue, documented the problem calling for a 
legislative remedy, and then selected a remedy that does not disproportionately 
burden the right. 
This approach to judicial review of legislation and regulations, which gives 
legislators and administrators an incentive to improve their process, will work in 
all cases where the courts currently use the level-of-scrutiny approach.  For 
 
review to a law removing certain protections from homosexuals); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-
30 (1982) (applying heightened review to a Texas law withholding funds from school districts that 
provided free education to the children of illegal immigrants); Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973) (applying heightened review to law that excluded from participation in the 
federal food stamp programs people those living in a household containing unrelated members). 
 271. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425; Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277; City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young, 427 U.S. 50.  Compare with those the 
heightened intermediate scrutiny utilized in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (indicating 
that government must demonstrate an “‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” in a sex 
discrimination case) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
 272. I realize that the Court does not admit to using heightened rational basis, nor does it always 
admit it is treating some speech as low value and applying a discounted intermediate scrutiny, but 
that is what it in fact does. 
 273. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008). 
 274. In addition, heightened rational basis review stays within a framework that is more 
acceptable to those who fear that balancing gives judges unfettered discretion. 
 275. See Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 383 (2009) (discussing the “continuing 
controversy over gun laws in the District of Columbia and the lower courts’ reactions to a wave of 
post-Heller challenges”). 
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example, in cases challenging invidious racial classifications, even a perfect 
legislative process will be able to justify such a classification only rarely, if 
ever.276  However, the results may be very different in cases challenging benign 
race-conscious actions or classifications.  This is true because it will be very 
difficult for the government to provide a legitimate reason for an invidious 
classification, while the government may have an important reason for a benign 
classification.277 
At the other end of the spectrum, where traditional rational basis governs, 
the suggested approach will lead to different results, at least until lawmakers 
learn to make a record sufficient to justify their actions.278  There is no point in 
having judicial review where the courts give nearly absolute deference to 
lawmakers who are unable to articulate a rational purpose for a classification.279  
The any “conceivable basis” standard, which requires the challenger to negate 
every conceivable basis that might support a law, even those not articulated by 
the defenders,280 places an almost impossible burden on the challenger and 
rewards sloppy lawmaking.281  Traditional rational basis would be eliminated, but 
that does not mean more laws will be struck down.  Rather, the result might be 
that lawmakers will limit their activity to laws that have a legitimate purpose, 
articulated in the law.282 
The result in cases that now fall between true strict scrutiny and traditional 
rational basis will not necessarily change, although that will depend on how 
much a law burdens a constitutional right, how well the lawmakers articulate 
their purpose, the importance of the purpose, and the nexus between the law and 
the purpose.283  In most cases, gender-based classifications will fail because there 
are so few situations where gender alone, stripped of all stereotypes, really makes 
a difference.284  Maybe lawmakers could gather empirical data and expert 
 
 276. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (suggesting that the burden on the government to 
override invidious racial discrimination is difficult, if not impossible). 
 277. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating the negative opinion of invidious classifications while illustrating that benign reasons 
exist).  “Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to 
enhance or maintain the power of the majority.  Remedial race-based preferences reflect the 
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.”  Id. 
 278. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding that 
the record did not contain evidence of a rational basis). 
 279. Cf. Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined:  Dissonance in the 
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1180 (1970) (arguing that “[i]t is unrealistic to 
sustain laws … on the basis of deference to a greater capacity of the legisla[ture]”). 
 280. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Requiring that the purpose of a statute be articulated is different than attempting to 
determine the motivation of anyone who votes in favor of it, a task that the Court is sometimes 
unwilling to undertake. 
 283. See footnote 251 and accompanying text. 
 284. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (finding that “maternal and paternal 
roles are not invariably different in importance”). 
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opinions that would support the conclusion that separate elementary schools for 
males and females would improve the education for both groups.285 
In short, a case’s outcome would not turn on which level-of-scrutiny 
category the court applies; rather, the outcome would turn on the record and 
whether it supports a law that burdens a constitutional right.  Judges would make 
judgments, but lawmakers could influence those judgments significantly by 
identifying the actual purpose of the law and the considerations that were taken 
into account to arrive at the legislative judgment reflected in the law.286  Each 
branch of government would retain its role, but the process each branch would 
engage in would be transparent and improved. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the highly politicized world of gun control, no standard of review will 
fully satisfy both sides of the battle.287  It may be that the decision in Heller, 
which recognized a self-defense-related right without defining the scope of the 
right, may ultimately lead to a resolution that reasonable people on both sides can 
tolerate.288  If the Court eventually adopts strict scrutiny as the controlling 
standard, then the pro-gun forces will have achieved a major victory since the 
Second Amendment would trump most gun-control legislation.  On the other 
hand, if the Court eventually adopts the heightened rational basis standard 
proposed here, then the pro-gun forces will have established that the Second 
Amendment is in play and requires legislative bodies to act carefully, while the 
anti-gun forces will have succeeded in containing the scope of the right, leaving 
most well-reasoned gun-control legislation in place.  Pro-gun forces will have 
won the battle, but maybe not the war? 
 
 285. Elizabeth Weil, Teaching to the Testosterone: Teaching Boys and Girls Separately, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/magazine/02sex3-t.html?scp=1&sq= 
teaching+to+the+testosterone&st=nyt. 
 286. Id. 
 287. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008). 
 288. Id. at 2816-17. 
